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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen belyser hvordan en bedrift kan fremme formelle og uformelle samhandlinger blant 
sine ansatte for å skape en kollektiv identitet og positivt påvirke deres innsats. Vi utvikler en Principal-
Agent modell, der de ansatte både har et personlig og et sosialt ideal for innsats (”effort”). Bedriften 
kan ikke observere de ansattes personlige idealer, noe som gir opphav til et ugunstig utvalgsproblem 
(”adverse selection”). Men bedriften kan påvirke arbeidsstyrkens følsomhet for det sosiale idealet ved 
å fordele en del av arbeidstiden til sosial interaksjon. Vi viser at det er to grunner til at bedriften ønsker 
å investere i sosial kapital. For det første forsterker det effektiviteten knyttet til bruken av monetære 
insentiver. For det andre, ved å skape en felles identitet blant de ansatte, er bedriften i stand til å 
redusere problemet med ugunstig utvalg. Vi viser også at bedriften er tjent med å tildele mer tid til 
sosiale aktiviteter når ansatte har lave personlige idealer for innsats eller når de er mer heterogene sett 
i forhold til idealene. 
Our oﬃces and cafes are designed to encourage interactions between Googlers within
and across teams, and to spark conversation about work as well as play.
(Google website, 2013)
I call it the `pronoun test', I ask frontline workers a few general questions about the
company. If the answers I get back describe the company in terms like `they' and `them,'
then I know it's one kind of company. If the answers are put in terms like `we' or `us,'
then I know it's a diﬀerent kind of company.
(Former U.S. Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, on visiting a company for the
ﬁrst time)
1 Introduction
United Parcel Service (hereafter UPS) is known as a company that constantly strives to improve its
eﬃciency: packages are sorted by computers to optimize the order of delivery; delivery routes are
designed to avoid left turns, so that no time is wasted waiting for a gap in oncoming traﬃc; and
drivers have to maintain a fast pace when walking. This company, which is continuously looking
to save seconds in the supply chain, has a somewhat unexpected practice: several minutes are set
aside for drivers and loaders to engage in a pre-work huddle, a team gathering before the drivers
leave the distribution center. According to UPS management, the objective of this practice is to
engender a team spirit between loaders and drivers (Cohen and Prusak, 2001). Fostering a certain
amount of social bonding among employees is not unique to UPS. Over the past few decades, many
ﬁrms have introduced new practices to make it easier for employees to develop formal and informal
interaction: new physical spaces such as open-plan oﬃces, places to relax, and meeting points are
designed to promote an environment of communication and information sharing among colleagues;
workshops and brainstorming sessions are held with the aim of promoting collective creativity and
mutual understanding; information technologies, such as email, intranet and chats favor exchange;
and team building activities, deﬁned as a variety of practices ranging from simple bonding exercises
to complex simulations, aim to generate a sense of cohesiveness among employees.1
1Cohen and Prusak (ibid.) give several examples of ﬁrms providing space and time to allow their employees to
interact. Notably, they describe how Alcoa, the world's leading producer of aluminum, moved to new headquarters in
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Why do ﬁrms allocate time and space to foster social interaction between their employees?
Besides creating a great atmosphere and facilitating the emergence of new ideas, the literature on
organizational identiﬁcation, a subﬁeld of management literature, has suggested that, by promoting
interaction, a ﬁrm may be seeking to induce its workforce to identify as part of a collective (the group
or the organization) and behave in ways that are normative for the collective identity (e.g., Pratt,
2000; Ellemers, De Gilder and Haslam, 2004; Van Dick, 2004; Cohen and Prusak, 2001). According
to these authors, shifting the employees' identity from being personal ("I") to collective ("we") has
two positive consequences. First, the group-based expectations, goals, or outcomes become a source
of implicit incentives for workers, coming to supplement or even replace other explicit and implicit
incentives. Second, by promoting the collective identity, the ﬁrm can keep possibly heterogeneous
employees together and secure their involvement in the work environment. In this context, the rise
of practices aimed at encouraging employee interaction and building collective identities could be
interpreted as an attempt by ﬁrms to counter reduced loyalty (Casey, 1996) or increased diversity
(Cohen and Prusak, 2001) among their workforces.2
In this article, we develop an agency model with a social norm in order to formalize the idea
that a ﬁrm might ﬁnd it proﬁtable to allocate time for its employees to interact, develop social
ties and create a collective identity. An employee's identity is modeled as an ideal for eﬀort,
which is a weighted combination of a personal ideal and a shared social ideal. Personal ideals
can diﬀer across employees and are not observed by the ﬁrm. This gives rise to an adverse selection
problem. Employees perform independent production tasks, which means that the only externalities
among workers are social. Although the existence of social interaction between employees could
also foster the exchange of information, ideas and know-how, we omit introducing technological or
1998 in which glass-walled conference rooms, meeting places, kitchens, and escalators occupy the center of each ﬂoor
and are designed to encourage workers to meet, mix, and chat. According to the CEO, Paul O'Neill, the ultimate
goal was to promote a sense of connection among employees. Conversely, Robin Dunbar (1998) explains why a TV
production unit experienced reduced productivity after being moved to a new workplace. It turned out that when the
architects were designing the new building, they decided that the coﬀee room where everyone ate their sandwiches at
lunch time was an unnecessary luxury and so dispensed with it ... If people were encouraged to eat their sandwiches
at their desks, then they were more likely to get on with their work and less likely to idle time away. And with that,
they inadvertently destroyed the intimate social networks that empowered the whole organization (italics added).
2The literature on organizational identiﬁcation is based on insights from social identity theory (Tajfel, 1972; Tajfel
and Turner 1979). This theory suggests that a person's identity is composed of two diﬀerent facets. Personal identity
corresponds to individual attributes that are not shared with other people. Social identity corresponds to attributes
that result from being a member of a social group. The literature on organizational identiﬁcation goes a step further
by suggesting that an organization can reinforce its employees' social identity through social bonding or training in
order to create implicit group incentives.
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informational spillovers in the production process in order to focus on social spillovers and their
management by the ﬁrm. This enables us to obtain three main new results. First, we take the
employees' sensitivity to the social ideal as given and determine the optimal payment scheme.
We show that, the more employees are sensitive to the social norm, the higher will be the power
of monetary incentives chosen by the ﬁrm and its proﬁts. This result is a consequence of an
eﬀect known in the economic literature as the social multiplier eﬀect, which, when applied to an
agency context, means that the existence of the social norm reinforces the eﬀectiveness of monetary
incentives (see for example Fischer and Huddart, 2008). Second, we allow the ﬁrm to alter the
employees' sensitivity to the social norm by choosing the part of working hours allocated to social
interaction. For the ﬁrm there is a cost of investing in social capital because less time is left for
production. There is also a beneﬁt: by favoring social bonding the ﬁrm makes its workforce more
sensitive to the social ideal. We show that the ﬁrm allocates more time for social interaction when
employees have low personal ideals for eﬀort: motivating employees through the collective identity
is used as a substitute for low individual work ethics. Third, we show that investing in social capital
allows the ﬁrm to alleviate the adverse selection problem. By promoting the shared social ideal, the
ﬁrm is able to mitigate the eﬀect of employees' heterogeneity on their individual behaviors and to
reduce the contractual distortions resulting from incomplete information. The consequence is that
the ﬁrm gives employees more time to develop social ties when the workforce is heterogeneous. These
last two results are consistent with the ﬁndings from the literature on organizational identiﬁcation.
There is a burgeoning theoretical literature that suggests that social norms have important eﬀects
on workers' behavior in the workplace.3 Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume that members of a team
suﬀer a utility loss when their own eﬀort level falls short of that of their co-workers. The consequence
is that workers exert more eﬀort than if peer eﬀects were absent. In an agency context, Fischer
and Huddart (2008) show that the existence of social norms fosters the eﬀectiveness of monetary
incentives. Although they do not solve for the optimal contract, they derive some implications for
the organizational boundaries of ﬁrms by distinguishing between a desirable and an undesirable
action, each with its own norm. Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2012) show that a particular norm can
be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing, depending on the incentive scheme a ﬁrm oﬀers.
They further show that low-eﬀort equilibria (where someone exerts a low eﬀort because others do
3We will discuss the growing empirical literature later in this article.
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the same) can coexist with high-eﬀort equilibria (where someone exerts a high eﬀort because others
do the same). Rob and Zemsky (2002) study the accumulation of social capital in a ﬁrm in which
a continuum of workers repeatedly perform an individual task and a cooperative task. The eﬀort
devoted to cooperation is not observable, but employees have preferences for helping that depend on
the degree of past cooperation. In this context, the ﬁrm can choose to limit the incentive intensity
on observable individual tasks in order to induce workers to be more helpful today and therefore
more pro-social tomorrow. Rob and Zemsky show that the dynamic process possibly admits several
steady states with diﬀerent cooperation levels, which the authors interpret as multiple corporate
cultures.4 In the present article, we rely on the work of Fischer and Huddart (2008) to introduce
a social norm for eﬀort in the employees' preferences. Compared to their article and the other
articles cited above, we add two elements to the analysis. First, we allow the ﬁrm to invest in
social capital by choosing the amount of social interaction among employees. Therefore, the ﬁrm
has an instrument other than the payment scheme to regulate workers' eﬀort. We show that a ﬁrst
motive for the ﬁrm to invest in social capital is to reinforce the eﬀectiveness of monetary incentives.
Second, we allow for heterogeneity among employees with regard to their personal ideals for work.
This gives a second motive to invest in social capital, namely creating a shared identity, in order to
mitigate the adverse selection problem. Akerlof and Kranton (2008) also consider an organization
that is able to aﬀect its workers' identity (ideal for eﬀort) through its management style. There is a
moral hazard problem regarding workers' eﬀort and the organization can either decide to monitor
its workforce closely or choose loose supervision. They assume that monitoring workers allows to
detect shirking more easily. But, at the same time, it reduces workers' ideal for eﬀort as there is
less identiﬁcation with the workgroup. Akerlof and Kranton characterize the circumstances under
which the organization prefers loose supervision. In this article, we endogenize workers' collective
identity and describe more fully how the ﬁrm is able to regulate this identity.
The article is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the theoretical model. In section
3, we derive the optimal linear contract. In section 4, we analyze how the ﬁrm regulates the social
norm among its employees. Section 5 concludes.
4Along these lines, Rotemberg (1994) and Dur and Sol (2010) consider models without social norms, but in which
two workers are endowed with altruistic preferences they can aﬀect by their choices. In Rotemberg, worker i decides
the degree to which he internalizes the utility of worker j. In Dur and Sol, worker i is able, by engaging in social
interaction with worker j, to increase j's degree of altruism. Both articles show that it is rational for workers to
invest in altruistic activities to some extent. In turn, the eﬃciency of the equilibrium is enhanced.
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2 Modeling personal and social ideals
We take a moral hazard framework à la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and extend it in two
directions. First, we include a social ideal for eﬀort in employees' preferences, following Fischer
and Huddart (2008). Second, we allow for some heterogeneity in the workforce regarding personal
ideals for eﬀort. The characteristics of employees are unobserved by the ﬁrm, which gives rise to a
problem of adverse selection. As we want to focus attention on the way work ideals aﬀect employees'
incentives and productivity, we choose to exclude other positive externalities such as technological
spillovers that could take place among employees when interacting or producing.
Agents. A risk-neutral ﬁrm employs a continuum of size one of risk-adverse employees to perform
similar, but independent tasks. Each employee is characterized by his personal ideal for eﬀort, t.
Personal ideals are distributed according to the probability distribution function f(t) deﬁned on
a set T =
[
t, t
]
. Let F (t) denote the cumulative distribution function associated with f(t). Each
employee exerts a level of eﬀort e, not observed by the ﬁrm, and produces a publicly observable
output y = e + ε. The term ε is an idiosyncratic unobservable noise following a centered normal
with variance σ2. The noise terms are independent across employees.5
Contracts. As employees are heterogeneous, the ﬁrm may ﬁnd it optimal to oﬀer diﬀerent con-
tracts to diﬀerent employees. We denote the menu of contracts by {w(t)}t∈T where w(t) is the
compensation paid by the ﬁrm to an employee with personal ideal t. As is common in contracting
literature, we limit attention to linear contracts of the shape w(t) = α(t)y + β(t) where α(t) is the
variable rate and β(t) is the base salary. We will sometimes refer to α(.) as the power of incentives.
Payoﬀs. Employees have a constant absolute risk aversion. The utility function of an employee of
personal ideal t choosing the contract w and eﬀort e is given by
U(w, e, n(t)) = −exp [−η (w − C(e, n(t))] (1)
where η represents the employee's constant absolute risk aversion, and C(e, n(t)) = 12 (e− n(t))2
5As personal ideals and eﬀorts are not observed by the ﬁrm, the model features simultaneous adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. See Laﬀont and Martimort (2002) and Theilen (2003) for a general analysis of so-called
mixed models.
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represents the extended cost function of the employee. The cost of eﬀort is decreasing up to the
point where the ideal n(t) is reached and increasing beyond this point. The ideal corresponds to the
eﬀort that employee t exerts when the variable rate of the compensation is zero but the base salary
is suﬃciently high to satisfy the participation constraint, which we deﬁne below. Following Fischer
and Huddart (2008), the ideal n(t) is a weighted average of two elements: the personal ideal of the
employee equal to t and a shared social ideal taken equal to the average eﬀort across employees,
E [e].6 We write
n(t) = λt+ (1− λ)E [e] (2)
where λ ∈ (0, 1]. The term 1 − λ of expression (2) reﬂects the employees' sensitivity to the social
ideal. When λ = 1, employees do not care about the social ideal of the workgroup and only take
into account their personal ideals when choosing their eﬀort levels. The standard cost function is
obtained by taking λ = 1 and t = 0. We also assume that employees have the same reservation
utility level U(w0) = −exp(−ηw0).
The risk-neutral ﬁrm's expected proﬁt is equal to the part of the expected production accruing
to the ﬁrm net of the ﬁxed salaries paid to the employees:
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt (3)
Timing of the game
• First, the ﬁrm chooses the amount of working hours left for employees to interact. This choice
alters the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal in a way we will describe precisely in section
4.
• Second, the ﬁrm proposes a menu of contracts {w(t)}t∈T .
• Third, each employee chooses one contract or exercises his outside option.
• Fourth, employees exert eﬀort. Outputs and payoﬀs are realized.
6Hence, the social ideal is associated with a unique reference group, which is the entire workforce. Each employee
takes this social ideal as given.
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3 The optimal linear contract
In this section, we take the sensitivity of employees to the social norm as given. First, we derive
the optimal level of eﬀort for employees. Second, we solve the problem of the ﬁrm and derive the
optimal menu of linear contracts.
3.1 Problem of an employee
Suppose for now that any employee selects the contract designed for him. An employee of personal
ideal t chooses his eﬀort level to maximize his certainty equivalent payoﬀ, α(t)e+β(t)− 12 (e− n(t))2−
1
2ησ
2α2(t). Solving for the optimal eﬀort gives
e(t) = α(t) + n(t) (4)
where n(t) is given by (2). Expression (4) characterizes the eﬀort exerted by employee t given the
work ideal, n(t). If the ﬁrm does not provide any monetary incentive at all (that is, if α(t) = 0),
the employee chooses a level of eﬀort equal to his work ideal. By taking the partial derivative of
expression (4) with respect to α(t), one can study how increasing the monetary incentive at the
margin aﬀects eﬀort when the eﬀect of the social norm is neutralized. We have
∂e(t)
∂α(t)
= 1 (5)
Eﬀort increases as the ﬁrm provides more monetary incentives. We now endogenize the social
norm. By plugging expression (4) into E [e] =
´ t¯
t e(t)f(t)dt, we obtain the average eﬀort exerted by
employees:7
E [e] = E [t] +
E [α]
λ
(6)
where E [α] =
´ t¯
t α(t)f(t)dt is the average power of incentives and E [t] =
´ t¯
t tf(t)dt is the average
personal ideal. Expression (6) shows that there are three sources fueling employees' eﬀort: their
personal work ideals, their social orientation, and the monetary incentives. Interestingly, the way
the average eﬀort depends on the average personal work ethic is not aﬀected by the employees'
7The fact that ∂e(t)/∂E [e] = 1− λ < 1 implies that there is only one equilibrium in eﬀort levels (see Cooper and
John (1988)), as opposed to the framework of Huck, Kübler and Weibull (2012).
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sensitivity to the social ideal: for the ﬁrm, having a pro-social workforce does not reduce the
positive inﬂuence of personal ideals on eﬀort. However, the way the average eﬀort depends on the
average power of monetary incentives is aﬀected by the sensitivity to the social ideal: a higher
sensitivity makes monetary incentives more eﬀective. The two previous results are driven by similar
social multiplier eﬀects. We ﬁrst describe the multiplier eﬀect on monetary incentives. Analytically,
it takes the following shape:
dE [e]
dE [α]
=
1
λ
=
1
λ
× ∂E [e]
∂E [α]
(7)
with 1/λ ≥ 1. To explore the functioning of the multiplier, let us sum expression (4) over types,
weighted by the probability distribution function f . We obtain
E [e] = E [α] + λE [t] + (1− λ)E [e] (8)
Let us suppose that the average power of monetary incentives E [α] increases by an amount equal to
4E [α]. In a ﬁrst round, this has a direct eﬀect on average eﬀort: the right-hand side in expression
(8) increases by4E [α], which causes the left-hand side E [e] to increase by the same amount. In the
second round, the change in monetary incentives has an indirect eﬀect on eﬀort through the social
norm: the higher social work ideal that emerged in the ﬁrst round induces employees to exert even
more eﬀort. Formally, the right-hand side increases by (1 − λ)4E [α], which causes an equivalent
rise in the left-hand side. Summing the successive increases, we obtain:
4E [e] = [1 + (1− λ) + (1− λ)2 + ...]4E [α] = [1 + 1− λ
λ
]
4E [α] = 1
λ
4E [α] (9)
The multiplier 1/λ can therefore be understood as the sum of the direct monetary eﬀect, 1, and the
indirect social eﬀect, (1− λ)/λ.
The same type of social multiplier eﬀect also explains why the relationship between the average
eﬀort and the average work ideal is not aﬀected by the employees' sensitivity to the social norm:
dE [e] /dE [t] = 1. To understand why, let us suppose that the average personal ideal E [t] increases
by 4E [t] in expression (8). At ﬁrst, this has a direct eﬀect on eﬀort: 4E [e] = λ4E [t]. Thereafter,
there is an inﬁnite sequence of indirect eﬀects, through increases of the social ideal. Summing the
successive eﬀects, we obtain 4E [e] = [λ+ λ(1− λ) + λ(1− λ)2 + ...]4E [t] = 4E [t].
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Using equations (4) and (6), we can express the eﬀort of an employee of personal ideal t as
e∗(t) = λt+ (1− λ)E [t] + 1
λ
(λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]) (10)
Expression (10) states that the eﬀort level e∗(t) is increasing in the power of incentives, α(t), and
in the average power of incentives, E [α]. Assume momentarily that α(t) is non-decreasing in t.
When employees are sensitive to the collective (that is, when λ < 1), an employee with a below
average personal ideal (that is, t < E [t]) chooses an eﬀort level higher than the one he would
choose if the sensitivity to the social norm were zero (that is, when λ = 1). The employee is
indeed more inﬂuenced by the average work ethic, E [t], while at the same time the eﬀectiveness
of monetary incentives is reinforced. However, an employee with an above average personal ideal
(that is, t > E [t]) may choose a higher or a lower eﬀort level when he becomes more sensitive to
the collective identity: while the employee is attracted by the lower average work ethic, monetary
incentives become more eﬀective so that the total eﬀect is ambiguous. We summarize the main
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. (1) Consider a given menu of linear contracts {w(t)}t∈T .
(a) The relationship between the average level of eﬀort E [e] and the average personal ideal E [t]
is not aﬀected by the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal.
(b) The average level of eﬀort E [e] is higher when employees are more sensitive to the social
ideal (that is, when λ is smaller). In fact, employees with a below average personal ideal exert a
higher level of eﬀort, whereas the eﬀect on eﬀort is ambiguous for employees with an above average
personal ideal.
(2) The fact that employees' preferences incorporate a social ideal creates a social multiplier ef-
fect, deﬁned in (7), which makes eﬀort more responsive to a change in monetary incentives. The
multiplier eﬀect is stronger when employees are more pro-social.
In their 2008 article, Fischer and Huddart introduce a social norm in an agency context and
derive the existence of a social multiplier eﬀect: social incentives reinforce the eﬀectiveness of
monetary incentives. Point 2 in Proposition 1 echoes their result and extends it to the case of
a heterogeneous workforce. Point 1(a) expresses a second social multiplier eﬀect that is largely
overlooked in the literature: having a more pro-social workforce does not weaken the positive
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relationship between the average personal work ideal and the average eﬀort. Together with point
2, this implies 1(b): the average eﬀort is higher when employees are more sensitive to the social
ideal.8 Interestingly, while the eﬀort exerted by below average workers necessarily increases when
inﬂuenced by peers, the eﬀort exerted by above average workers may decrease or increase. These
theoretical results are in line with recent empirical ﬁndings. Mas and Moretti (2009) study how the
productivity of cashiers in a supermarket chain is aﬀected by the productivity of their peers. They
show that workers increase their eﬀort levels by 1% when a worker with above average productivity
joins their shift. They obtain two complementary results. First, while low-productivity workers
beneﬁt from the presence of more productive workers, the productivity of high-skill workers is not
aﬀected by the presence of low-skill co-workers. Second, the magnitude of the spillover depends
positively on the frequency of interaction in the workplace. Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2010)
study whether the productivity of fruit pickers is aﬀected by the presence of co-workers with whom
they share social ties. They consider a situation in which there are no externalities among workers
in production, or compensation. They ﬁnd that, compared to a situation without social ties, a given
worker's productivity is signiﬁcantly higher when working with more able friends, but signiﬁcantly
lower when working with less able friends.
To conclude this section, it is interesting to calculate the certainty equivalent payoﬀ for an
employee with personal ideal t when he exerts the optimal eﬀort level (10). We have
u(t, α(t), β(t)) = β(t) +
1− λ
λ
α(t)E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(t) (11)
Note that ∂2u/∂t∂α(t) = λ > 0: Employees with a high personal ideal are more sensitive to an
increase in the power of incentives than employees with a low personal ideal. This single-crossing
condition will help the ﬁrm to screen diﬀerent types of employees under incomplete information.
8In the model, the level of personal ideals is not aﬀected by the power of incentives proposed by the ﬁrm.
Accordingly, there is no crowding-out eﬀect of intrinsic motivation by monetary incentives. The model could be
extended to include a reduced form of the crowding-out mechanisms modeled in the literature (see, for example,
Francois (2000) in the context of public sector motivation, Canton (2005) in a multitask environment, Bénabou and
Tirole (2003) in an informed principal setting, and Bénabou and Tirole (2006) in the case of pro-social behaviors).
We omit introducing such mechanisms and concentrate on the analysis of social norms and adverse selection.
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3.2 Problem of the ﬁrm
We now turn to the problem of the ﬁrm for a given level of employee sensitivity to the social ideal.
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider the situation in which the ﬁrm knows the employees' personal
ideals. We then consider the situation in which the ﬁrm cannot observe personal ideals.
3.2.1 The case of complete information about personal ideals
The ﬁrm determines the menu of contracts by maximizing its expected proﬁt
max
{α(t),β(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt (12)
under the participation constraints
∀t ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ w0 (13)
where e∗(t) is deﬁned in (10) and u(t, α(t), β(t)) in (11). At the optimum, the participation con-
straints must be binding. We show in Appendix 1 that the ﬁrm's program can be written
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λ
+ t− w0 − 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (14)
Maximizing pointwise, we obtain the optimal power of incentives for each type of employee:
∀t ∈ T, α∗CI(t) =
1
λ(1 + ησ2)
(15)
where CI stands for complete information. Expression (15) extends the expression of the optimal
power of incentives derived in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to the case in which workers have a
social work ideal. As in their framework, the ﬁrm chooses low-powered incentives when the perceived
risk level, ησ2, is high. Three other points are worth noting. First, the ﬁrm chooses the same variable
rate for all employees, regardless of their personal ideals. This is due to the fact that the personal
ideal of an employee does not aﬀect the way his eﬀort responds to monetary incentives: Expression
(10) implies that ∂2e∗(t)/∂t∂α(t) = 0. Second, the ﬁrm chooses a higher power of incentives when
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employees are more sensitive to the social ideal. In this situation, the social multiplier eﬀect (7) is
indeed strengthened, so that eﬀort becomes more reactive to an increase in the variable rate of the
compensation scheme. Third, at equilibrium, the ﬁrm has to oﬀer a higher base salary to employees
with a low personal ideal. This is because, for a menu of contracts with equal variable rates, the
certainty equivalent (11) is increasing in the employees' personal ideal. This explains why, under
incomplete information, the ﬁrm will have to propose a diﬀerent menu of contracts in order to
prevent employees with high personal ideals from switching to contracts aimed at employees with
low personal ideals.
3.2.2 The case of incomplete information about personal ideals
We now assume that the ﬁrm does not observe the employees' personal ideals. The ﬁrm has to
make sure that each type of employee chooses the contract designed for him. The proﬁt maximizing
program becomes
max
{α(t),β(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt (16)
under the participation constraints
∀t ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ w0 (17)
and the incentive constraints
∀t, t′ ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ u(t, α(t′), β(t′)) (18)
Let us consider two employees whose personal ideals t and t′ satisfy t′ > t. Summing the two
incentive constraints u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ u(t, α(t′), β(t′)) and u(t′, α(t′), β(t′)) ≥ u(t′, α(t), β(t)) gives
α(t′) ≥ α(t): Incentive compatibility implies that the power of incentives α(.) has to be non-
decreasing. Using standard arguments, we show in Appendix 2 that the optimization problem of
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the ﬁrm can be simpliﬁed to
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λ
+ t− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (19)
under the constraints
∀t ∈ T, dα(t)
dt
≥ 0 (20)
Expressions (14) and (19) diﬀer because of the term
´ t
t
λα(t)(1−F (t))
f(t) f(t)dt reﬂecting the informational
rent the ﬁrm has to give to types t > t for them not to deviate from their speciﬁed contracts. This
rent is increasing in λ: The adverse selection problem is more severe when employees are less
concerned with the collective identity. To solve the maximization problem, we ignore momentarily
the constraints (20) and maximize expression (19) pointwise. We obtain
∀t ∈ T, α∗II(t) =
1
λ(1 + ησ2)
− λ1− F (t)
f(t)
1
1 + ησ2
(21)
where II stands for incomplete information. To guarantee that the neglected constraints (20) are
veriﬁed, we make the following assumption, which is common in an agency context, regarding the
hazard rate:
Assumption 1. The hazard rate f(t)1−F (t) is increasing in t.
9
Under Assumption 1, the ﬁrm is able to screen employees according to their personal ideals. The
properties of α∗II(t) are described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
1. The power of incentives α∗II(t) is increasing in t. There is no distortion in the contract
designed for the highest personal ideal: α∗II(t¯) = α
∗
CI(t¯) and there is a downward distortion for the
other personal ideals: α∗CI(t)− α∗II(t) = λ1−F (t)f(t) 11+1ησ2 increases as t approaches t.
2. The ﬁrm provides stronger monetary incentives when employees are more sensitive to the
social norm: α∗II(t) increases when λ decreases. Furthermore, the distortion measured by α
∗
CI(t)−
α∗II(t) decreases when employees are more sensitive to the social norm.
9This assumption is veriﬁed for distributions such as the uniform, the normal, the exponential, the logistic and
the Laplace, among others.
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3. The power of incentives α∗II(t) is decreasing in the perceived risk level, ησ
2.
Point 1 of Proposition 2 is a result typical of adverse selection problems. To prevent employees
with a high personal ideal from deviating, the ﬁrm has to give employees with smaller personal
ideals a contract in which the power of incentives is lower than under complete information, but in
which the ﬁxed part of the compensation is larger (to satisfy the participation constraint). As a
consequence, there is a downward distortion compared with the case of complete information. Point
2 conveys two important new results. First, the ﬁrm chooses a higher power of monetary incentives
when employees are more sensitive to the social ideal. As employees become more oriented toward
the collective, the social multiplier stated in Proposition 1 has a stronger eﬀect on the average
eﬀort: dE [e] /dE [α] = 1/λ increases as λ decreases. Second, the distortion between the complete
information case and the incomplete information case, α∗CI(t)−α∗II(t), is reduced when employees are
more sensitive to the social norm. In fact, the inﬂuence of heterogeneous personal ideals on individual
behaviors diminishes when employees become more concerned with the group environment. In this
case the ﬁrm proposes less diﬀerentiated monetary incentives.10 In point 3, we retrieve a standard
result of moral hazard models that the ﬁrm chooses a lower power of monetary incentives when
employees are more risk adverse (higher η) or when output is less linked to eﬀort (higher σ). At
equilibrium the proﬁt of the ﬁrm is
pi∗(λ) = E [t]− w0 + 1
2(1 + ησ2)
t¯ˆ
t
1
λ2
(
1− λ
2 (1− F (t))
f(t)
)2
f(t)dt (22)
Not surprisingly, the proﬁt is increasing in the average personal ideal, E [t], and increasing when
employees become more sensitive to the social ideal.
10If all employees have the same personal ideal tˆ (that is, T =
{
tˆ
}
), then 1−F (tˆ)
f(tˆ)
= 0 and we have:
α∗(tˆ) =
1
λ(1 + ησ2)
.
We retrieve the result of section 3.2.1 concerning the case of complete information about personal ideals.
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4 Regulating employees' ideals through social interaction.
We now assume that the ﬁrm is able to aﬀect the social orientation of its workforce by choosing
the amount of time during which employees can interact. Social interaction can, for example, be
fostered and to some extent controlled by the ﬁrm through the design of the workplace, through
the holding of workshops and team-building activities, or by facilitating recreational breaks. There
is a large amount of empirical evidence in sociology, management science, political science, and
economics suggesting that individuals are more sensitive to a group norm when they have frequent
interaction with the other individuals belonging to the group (e.g., Cialdini and Trost, 2008, for
sociology; Cohen and Prusak, 2001, for management science; Putnam, 1995, for political science;
Mas and Moretti, 2009, and Bandieri, Barankay, and Rasul, 2008 and 2010, for economics). Cohen
and Prusak note, for example, that if you want people to connect, to talk, to begin to understand
and depend on one another, give them places and occasions for meeting, and enough time to develop
networks and communities. Social capital needs breathing room - social space and time - within
work and surrounding work.11 Sociologists emphasize the fact that people learn and internalize the
values embodied in the norms through repeated interaction with others (Bicchieri and Muldoon,
2011). The act of matching behaviors and beliefs to a group norm is referred to as conformity and
is seen as the result of unconscious inﬂuences, social pressure, or rewards and punishments inﬂicted
by the group for following or not following the norm. Individuals become more aﬀected by these
stimuli when they interact frequently, and they are more willing to bear the emotional investment
initially required to conform: their sensitivity to the group norm increases.
We normalize the length of employees' working time to 1. The ﬁrm divides the time between a
productive period of length p where the instantaneous production problem is described in the two
previous sections, and a period of length b = 1 − p during which social bonding takes place. The
ﬁrm is able to announce and commit to the allocation of working hours before proposing the menu
of contracts. As explained above, we assume that the employees' sensitivity to the social ideal is
aﬀected by the ﬁrm's choice. The more time is allocated to social interaction, the more employees
11Friedley and Manchester (2005) make a similar point to explain what determines team cohesion in speech teams
in high schools and colleges: It is communication in the human moment that most powerfully creates team cohesion
- a strong sense of loyalty and commitment to the team vision as one's own ... Whether a room or lounge where team
members can congregate between classes and the end of the day, practice space for formal and informal coaching
sessions, travel time in cars and vans, or social time to enjoy pizza and a movie, both quantity and quality of
communication are necessary to build a cohesive team climate of openness and trust.
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become sensitive to the social norm. Formally, λ(p) is increasing in p.12 We assume that during
the period in which social bonding takes place, the employees receive their reservation wage, w0, at
each instant of time. The ﬁrm solves
max
p
ppi∗ (λ(p)) + (1− p)(−w0)
where pi∗ (λ) is given by expression (22). Let ελ(p) denote the elasticity of λ with respect to p:
ελ(p) =
pλ′(p)
λ(p) . We make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (a) The function ελ is increasing in p. (b) There is a level pˆ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
ελ(pˆ) = 1/2. Let bˆ = 1− pˆ.
The ﬁrst part of Assumption 2 means that investing in social capital has decreasing returns:
when the initial level of interaction is low (respectively, high), allowing for more interaction among
employees has a strong positive impact (respectively, a low impact) on their sensitivity to the social
norm. The second part of the assumption guarantees that the eﬀect of increasing interaction on
employees' sensitivity to the group is suﬃciently high to ensure that the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to invest in social capital. We determine the optimal length of social interaction in Appendix 3.
The properties are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose the average personal ideal of employees is E(t) = tˆ.
1. When employees are homogeneous with regard to their personal ideals (T =
{
tˆ
}
), the ﬁrm
chooses to devote a proportion b∗ of working time to social interaction. We have b∗ = bˆ if tˆ = 0,
where bˆ is deﬁned in Assumption 2. Furthermore, b∗ is decreasing in tˆ.
2. When employees are heterogeneous with regard to their personal ideals, the ﬁrm chooses to
devote a share b∗∗ of working time to social interaction. We have b∗∗ > b∗. Furthermore b∗∗ is
decreasing in tˆ.
Proposition 3 expresses two results. First, it is more proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to devote time to
developing the employees' social ideal when their average personal ideal is low. In this case, eﬀort
is less fueled by personal work ethics and it is therefore less costly for the ﬁrm to replace productive
activities with bonding activities. Second, for a given average personal ideal, the ﬁrm devotes more
12It is convenient to express the analytical problem in p rather than in b.
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time to developing social interaction for heterogeneous employees than for homogeneous employees.
When employees are heterogeneous, the ﬁrm faces an adverse selection problem when designing the
contracts, and it has to give a rent to the employees with a high personal ideal for eﬀort to make
them choose the right contract. By fostering the social orientation of the workforce, the ﬁrm is
able to reduce the eﬀect of heterogeneity on individual behaviors and reduce the adverse selection
problem. Its proﬁt therefore increases.13
The past few decades have seen a surge in the number of ﬁrms using bonding activities. What
has driven such a change? Some researchers suggest that, in times when job security and employees'
attachment to ﬁrms are diminishing, ﬁrms could use soft management policies to shift employees'
identity from being personal to being collective (Casey, 1996 or Pratt, 2000). Casey (1996) notes,
for example, that the devices of workplace family and team manifest a corporate eﬀort to provide
emotional gratiﬁcations at work to counter the attractions of rampant individualism. Nevertheless
there is still a lively debate about the real trend in work ethics in recent decades, with some authors
suggesting a declining trend and others suggesting stability or even an increasing trend (Twenge,
2010). Other researchers highlight the dramatic changes that have occurred in the demographics of
the workforce in developed countries in recent decades. These changes include increases in gender,
age, ethnic and cultural diversity.14 This shift in workforce demographics suggests that work ethos
have become more and more diverse and contrasting among employees. Cohen and Prusak (2001)
explain that nurturing professional and personal connections among workers is a way for ﬁrms to
deal with their growing diversity: The collective identity that emerges from the interaction serves
as glue for a heterogeneous group of people. Proposition 3 shows that our model is consistent with
these two types of explanations: a decrease in the average personal work ideal of employees or a
greater heterogeneity of the workforce leads the ﬁrm to allocate more time to bonding activities.
13Note that, if Assumption 2(b) was not satisﬁed, the ﬁrm would not allocate time for social interaction, if faced
with homogeneous employees.
14For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the median age of the American workforce was
about 41 years in 2008, compared to about 36 twenty years earlier. For the ﬁrst time in American history, there are
four generations in the workplace. As regards the participation of women in the workforce, women hold 51.4 percent
of managerial and professional jobs in 2010, up from 26.1 percent in 1980.
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5 Concluding remarks
The literature on economics and management theory has recently emphasized that workers are
not driven solely by personal considerations but are also concerned with the goals and beliefs of
the group or organization in which they work. This observation has led some authors to suggest
that ﬁrm could regulate workers' sensitivity to this social identity in order to foster performance.
In their textbook Economics, Organizations and Management, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) note,
for example, that "important features of many organizations can best be understood in terms of
deliberate attempts to change preferences of individual participants". One way for ﬁrms to shape
and change the identities of their employees is to provide them with time and space to meet and
interact. The ﬁrm plays the role of a socialization device, fostering the emergence of a collective
identity within the workforce. In this article, we develop a model to study the circumstances under
which a ﬁrm invests in social capital in order to strengthen the social orientation of its employees
and provide extra incentives to exert eﬀort. While there is an opportunity cost associated with
bonding activities, namely that less time is available for production, there are also two beneﬁts.
First, a social multiplier eﬀect makes monetary incentives more eﬀective and the average eﬀort
increases. Second, the distortive eﬀect of adverse selection on contracts is reduced as the shared
social ideal becomes more important to employees than their heterogeneous personal ideals. We
show that motivating employees through the collective identity acts as a substitute for declining
individual work ethics and constitutes a solution for dealing with a greater heterogeneity in the
workforce.
Several extensions of the model could be of interest. First, we have focused on a case where
the only externalities amongst employees are social. This allows us to isolate the eﬀect of the
social ideal on incentives. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that the social interaction taking
place in the workplace also facilitates the exchange of information between employees and the
development of new ideas. Therefore, it could be interesting to modify the model so that, in
addition to their eﬀects on work ideals, interactions also engender technological spillovers between
workers and improvements in the productive process. This should reinforce the incentives of the
ﬁrm to invest in social capital and use high powered incentives. Second, there is only one reference
group in our framework, namely the entire workforce, relative to which the social ideal of eﬀort is
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deﬁned. It could be interesting to make the number of reference groups endogenous and assume
that employees choose the group they wish to conform to. Third, we assume that employees have
the same sensitivity to the social norm. Another possible extension could therefore be to allow for
diﬀerent degrees of sensitivity.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Derivation of the optimal contract under complete information
Using expressions (4) and (10) and setting α(t)e∗(t) + β(t) − 12 (e∗(t)− n(t))2 − 12ησ2α2(t) = w0,
we can write
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t)− β(t)) f(t)dt =
t¯ˆ
t
(
e∗(t)− w0 − 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
(
λt+ (1− λ)E [t] + λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λ
− w0 − α
2(t)
2
(1 + ησ2)
)
f(t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λ
+ t− w0 − 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt
Appendix 2. Derivation of the optimal contract under incomplete information
We want to show that the program
max
{α(t),β(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
((1− α(t))e∗(t))− β(t)) f(t)dt (23)
subject to
∀t ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ w0 (24)
and
∀t, t′ ∈ T, u(t, α(t), β(t)) ≥ u(t, α(t′), β(t′)) (25)
can be simpliﬁed to
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λ
+ t− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (26)
subject to the constraints
∀t ∈ T, dα(t)
dt
= 0 (27)
We roughly follow the method of Laﬀont and Martimort (2002). For convenience, let us deﬁne
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u(t, t˜) = u(t, α(t˜), β(t˜)) where
u(t, α(t˜), β(t˜)) = β(t˜) +
1− λ
λ
α(t˜)E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t˜) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(t˜) (28)
is the certainty equivalent payoﬀ for an employee with personal ideal t when he has chosen the
contract
{
α(t˜), β(t˜)
}
(see equation (11)). Let u(t) = u(t, t). Condition (25) implies the following
local ﬁrst-order condition for type t: ∂u(t,t˜)
∂t˜
∣∣∣
t˜=t
= 0 or
dβ(t)
dt
+
1− λ
λ
dα(t)
dt
E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])dα(t)
dt
+ (1− ησ2)α(t)dα(t)
dt
= 0 (29)
The local second-order condition for t is ∂
2u(t,t˜)
∂t˜2
∣∣∣
t˜=t
≤ 0 or
d2β(t)
dt2
+
1− λ
λ
d2α(t)
dt2
E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])d
2α(t)
dt2
+ (1− ησ2)
((
dα(t)
dt
)2
+ α(t)
d2α(t)
dt2
)
≤ 0
(30)
By diﬀerentiating (29) with respect to t, we ﬁnd
d2β(t)
dt2
+
1− λ
λ
d2α(t)
dt2
E [α]+λ
dα(t)
dt
+(λt+(1−λ)E [t])d
2α(t)
dt2
+(1−ησ2)
((
dα(t)
dt
)2
+ α(t)
d2α(t)
dt2
)
= 0
(31)
By using (30), (31) can be written more simply as dα(t)dt ≥ 0. Note that the local incentive constraint
for employee t (expression (29)) implies the global incentive constraint for t (expression (25)). To
prove it, let us consider t′ 6= t. Using (29), we can write
β(t)− β(t′) =
ˆ t
t′
β˙(τ)dτ (32)
= −
ˆ t
t′
(
1− λ
λ
α˙(τ)E [α] + (λτ + (1− λ)E [t])α˙(τ) + (1− ησ2)α(τ)α˙(τ)
)
dτ
= −
ˆ t
t′
∂
∂τ
(
1− λ
λ
α(τ)E [α] + (λτ + (1− λ)E [t])α(τ) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(τ)− λA(τ)
)
dτ
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where A(τ) is a primitive of α(τ). We have
β(t)− β(t′) = −
[
1− λ
λ
α(τ)E [α] + (λτ + (1− λ)E [t])α(τ) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(τ)
]t
t′
+
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ
= −1− λ
λ
α(t)E [α]− (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t)− 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(t) + 1− λ
λ
α(t′)E [α]
+(λt′ + (1− λ)E [t])α(t′) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(t′) +
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ (33)
Hence
β(t) +
1− λ
λ
α(t)E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t])α(t) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(t)
= β(t′) +
1− λ
λ
α(t′)E [α] + (λt′ + (1− λ)E [t])α(t′) + 1
2
(1− ησ2)α2(t′) +
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ
= β(t′)+
1− λ
λ
α(t′)E [α]+(λt+(1−λ)E [t])α(t′)+ 1
2
(1−ησ2)α2(t′)−λ(t−t′)α(t′)+
ˆ t
t′
λα(τ)dτ
(34)
Therefore u(t, t) = u(t, t′) − λ(t − t′)α(t′) + ´ tt′ λα(τ)dτ . However −λ(t − t′)α(t′) +
´ t
t′ λα(τ)dτ is
positive because we know from above that α(t) is non-decreasing. Hence, for any t′ 6= t, u(t, t) ≥
u(t, t′): the global incentive constraint is satisﬁed for type t.
We now rewrite the maximization problem of the ﬁrm as a function of α(t) and u(t) instead of
α(t) and β(t). We know that u(t) = β(t) + 1−λλ α(t)E [α] + (λt+ (1−λ)E [t])α(t) + 12(1− ησ2)α2(t).
The incentive constraints (29) are replaced by the constraints du(t)dt = λα(t) and
dα(t)
dt ≥ 0.15 Using
the fact that du(t)dt > 0 allows the participation constraints (24) to be simpliﬁed to u(t) = w0. The
maximization program of the ﬁrm becomes
max
{α(t),u(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λ
+ λt+ (1− λ)E [t]− u(t)− 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (35)
under the constraints:
∀t ∈ T, du(t)
dt
= λα(t) (36)
15Indeed du(t)
dt
= λα(t) +
(
dβ(t)
dt
+ 1−λ
λ
dα(t)
dt
E [α] + (λt+ (1− λ)E [t]) dα(t)
dt
+ (1− ησ2)α(t) dα(t)
dt
)
, but the term in
parentheses is zero from the ﬁrst-order condition (29).
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∀t ∈ T, dα(t)
dt
= 0 (37)
u(t) = w0 (38)
Using (36) and (38), we have u(t) = u(t)+
´ t
t λα(τ)dτ = w0 +
´ t
t λα(τ)dτ . Therefore, we can rewrite
(35) as
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λ
+ λt+ (1− λ)E [t]−
tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ − w0 − 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
 f(t)dt
(39)
However
t¯ˆ
t
 tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ
 f(t)dt =
F (t) tˆ
t
λα(τ)dτ
t
t
−
t¯ˆ
t
(λα(t))F (t)dt
=
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t)dt−
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t)F (t)dt =
t¯ˆ
t
λα(t) (1− F (t)) dt (40)
As a consequence the maximization problem of the ﬁrm becomes
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
λα(t) + (1− λ)E [α]
λ
+ λt+ (1− λ)E [t]− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt
(41)
subject to the constraints (37), or
max
{α(t)}
t¯ˆ
t
(
α(t)
λ
+ t− w0 − λα(t) (1− F (t))
f(t)
− 1
2
(1 + ησ2)α2(t)
)
f(t)dt (42)
subject to (37).
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Appendix 3. Proof of Proposition 3.
We solve
max
p
p
E [t]− w0 + 1
2(1 + ησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
(
1− λ
2(p) (1− F (t))
f(t)
)2
f(t)dt
+ (1− p)(−w0) (43)
Let X(t, p) = 1− λ2(p)(1−F (t))f(t) . The ﬁrst-order condition is
E [t] +
1
2(1 + ησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
X2(t, p)f(t)dt
−p
 λ′(p)
(1 + ησ2)λ3(p)
t¯ˆ
t
X2(t, p)f(t)dt+
2
(1 + ησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
λ(p)λ′(p)(1− F (t))
f(t)
X(t, p)f(t)dt
 = 0
(44)
or
E [t] +
1
(1 + ησ2)λ2(p)
(
1
2
− ελ(p)
) t¯ˆ
t
X2(t, p)f(t)dt
− 2p
(1 + ησ2)λ2(p)
t¯ˆ
t
λ(p)λ′(p)(1− F (t))
f(t)
X(t, p)f(t)dt = 0 (45)
where ελ(p) =
pλ′(p)
λ(p) .
Let E(t) = tˆ. Suppose that employees are identical. Expression (45) reduces to
tˆ+
1
(1 + ησ2)λ2(p)
(
1
2
− ελ(p)
)
= 0 (46)
If tˆ = 0 then the solution of (46) is p∗ = pˆ with ελ(pˆ) = 1/2. If tˆ > 0 then the solution of (46)
is p∗ > pˆ. It is easily veriﬁed that p∗ is increasing in tˆ. Suppose employees are not identical (and
hence necessarily tˆ > 0) then
´ t¯
t X
2(t, p)f(t)dt < 1. The solution of (45) is therefore p∗∗ < p∗.
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